أحمد محمد لبن Ahmad.M.Lbn مؤسس ومدير المنتدى
عدد المساهمات : 52879 العمر : 72
| موضوع: Conclusions الأربعاء 16 يناير 2019, 4:52 pm | |
| Conclusions It is amazing to see how Islam is critiqued on so many fronts when it comes to human rights. Upon closer inspection, though, one finds that it is actually human rights law that is inconsistent. The attacks on Islam and its view of human rights seem to be more based on a bias against religion in general and Islam in particular.
Islam is criticized by many by putting too many restrictions on women and not granting them the same rights as men. At the same time, European nations repeatedly have banned Muslim women from wearing the Islamic dress known as hijab. This is a clear restriction of their freedom in the same way that Islam telling women that they cannot go about dress provocatively is a restriction of their freedom. Yet the former human rights courts have no problem approving. They do so in the name of secularism, protecting public morals, equality and national unity.
However, these same European countries have no problem with publishing disparaging cartoons about the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him). Apparently, the same issues of protecting public morals and national unity are of no importance here. It was known beforehand that such cartoons would be divisive and may even lead to violence within the European nations. In some perverse way, all of a sudden, it is the freedom to act that reigns supreme in this situation. Human rights activists throughout the world supported the newspapers right to publish those cartoons about the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him).
Finally, when it comes to laws of apostasy and the like, human rights activists seem to be clear that none should be killed in the name of God or for the sake of religion. At the same time, people may be killed for numerous other reasons related to reasons of state.
Beyond the inconsistencies described above, this chapter exposed some other very important facts about the human rights paradigm.
In this chapter, a number of controversial topics related to Islam and human rights have been touched upon.Europe is considered the most progressive in the world when it comes to human rights. Hence, this chapter began with a study of how the European human rights courts have dealt with the issue of human rights.Those courts and decisions clearly exhibited the fact that human rights can be manipulated or overruled in favor of two other vague concepts, secularism and democracy. In essence, this means that there is no true human rights paradigm or movement today. If, according to the leaders of the human rights paradigm in progressive Europe, human rights can be trumped by secularism or democracy, this means that the movement is not about human rights. Human rights is simply a secondary goal or a tool that is used to promote secularism and democracy.
If the ideology or system of secularism/democracy is able to trump human rights, should the ideology or system of Islam also be allowed to trump human rights? Certainly for believers in an Islamic state, adhering to Islam is more precious and important than individual human rights. Just as it the laicite or secularism of France is given preference over individual rights in France, as endorsed by the European Court of Human Rights, certainly Islamic Law should be given the same priority in Islamic states. Of course, the standard reply is: “But secularism and democracy allows for freedom for all…” However, that is a bogus argument and it was debunked earlier in this chapter and in the previous chapter.
The reality is that states and systems of law do have the right and imperative to restrict freedoms. As Baderin noted, By their nature, both law and political authority constitute some limitation upon the freedom and liberties of individuals. Perhaps, the correct perception is as stated by Locke that ‘…Liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others, which cannot be, where there is no law:… Freedom is not, as we are told, A Liberty for every Man to do what he lists’. Under what has been described as the ‘ fundamental liberal principle’there only exists a kind of presumption in favour of liberty, which places the burden of proof on anyone who contends for any restriction on it. Thus the power of the State to interfere in the actions of individuals is not completely ousted under liberal theory or within human rights but only curtailed to its legitimate necessity. The necessity of control by the political authority through law is recognized, but any limitations they impose upon individual liberties and freedoms must be justifiable in accordance with the law and not be arbitrary. The justificatory principle thus establishes that restrictions upon the rights of individuals must be clearly determinable and justifiable under the law in order not to violate their freedom, liberties and fundamental human rights.
This passage from Baderin would imply that the Islamic State could justify many restrictions on liberty in light of its overall goals for society. However, in the above passage Baderin has failed the important caveat that forms part of the human rights paradigm. It is recognized that rights cannot be free. They must be subjected to some greater authority. In the writings of contemporary human rights proponents and in contemporary human rights law, that greater authority can be or must be a secular democracy and cannot be a religious authority—although they fail to explicitly prove why one should be accepted and the one rejected.
Clapham, for example, writes that rights and freedoms may be interfered with but only on the bases of the following three questions: • is there a legitimate aim to the interference? • is the interference prescribed by a clear and accessible law? • is the interference proportionate to the identified legitimateaim and necessary in a democratic society?
Mayer even admits that “absolute freedoms” may be restricted but never on the basis of religion.
Mayer writes, But even Mayer recognizes limits: International law recognizes that many rights protections are not absolute and may be suspended or qualified in exceptional circumstances such as wars or public emergencies or even in normal circumstances in the interests of certain overriding considerations. In international law, one expects these overriding considerations to fall within one of several established categories. Qualifications may be placed on human rights in the aggregate common interest and to serve particular, specified policies. The latter might include the preservation of national security, public safety, public order, morals, the rights and freedom of others, the interests of justice, and the public interest in a democratic society. To ensure that accommodations and derogations are made within structures of authority and to prevent arbitrariness in decisions, the measures imposing these limitations must be taken in accordance with the law… International law does not accept that fundamental human rights may be restricted—much less permanently curtailed—by reference to the requirements of any particular religion. International law provides no warrant for depriving Muslims of human rights by according primacy to Islamic criteria. Thus, to limit or dilute human rights in deference to the requirements of the shari’a is to qualify human rights established under international law by standards that are not recognized as legitimate bases for curtailing rights.
Similarly, Howland states that rights may be restricted based on morality and public order but, “The terms ‘morality’ and ‘public order’ are thus limited to meaning public order and morality in the context of democratic principles… Thus, national law or religious law may not be the source for either of these standards. Furthermore, article 29 requires the same treatment for all rights, and thus corresponding situations must be treated symmetrically. For example, if a state enacts a law protecting religion to the detriment of women, a determination must be made as to whether such limitations on the rights of women are necessary for the due recognition of the religion and the just requirements of a democratic society. This must be symmetric to the case of a state that enacts a law protecting women against religious pressures and a determination must be made as to whether the limitation on religion is necessary for the due recognition of the rights of women and the just requirements of a democratic society.
(According to Howland, apparently, “morality” cannot even be based on a nation’s religion.)
Thus, once again, the issue is not the question of curtailing human rights. The issue is based on what are such human rights to be curtailed. |
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