Accepting the Fact that they are part of International Law Today—or Once Again Begging the Question
An-Na’im, who calls for a complete reform of the understanding of the Shariah in the name of international human rights, can offer very little to substantiate the authority of human rights, save for the fact that they have become part of international law today.  He then goes on argues that international human rights are those that people deserve simply because they are human. 

However, once again, that does not prove anything. In fact, he is arguing that there are basic rights that are found throughout the various cultures in the world while at the same time arguing that the traditional Shariah stands in the way of those human rights. But the Shariah is a culture for numerous peoples throughout the world. This means that he is contradicting himself. How can all of those cultures agree on those principles while those of the Shariah cultures, hardly a small number in the world, are violating them?


His argument is:
“Applying the principle of reciprocity among all human beings rather than just among the members of a particular group, I would argue that universal human rights are those which a cultural tradition would claim for its own members and must therefore concede to members of other traditions if it is to expect reciprocal treatment from those others.” 

But this must be a question of a “lowest common denominator.” If, as he claims, Islamic culture does not give X, Y and Z rights to women and non-Muslims, he is, in essence, saying that Islamic culture does not recognize these rights for all the members of its community. Thus, any such rights which are not afforded these two groups within Islamic culture cannot be considered fundamental human rights, according to his own manner of arguing. Unless he is arguing that fundamental human rights are those that each culture offer the “privileged” members of its society. However, that is not what he is arguing and would also contradict the premise of his claims.

Actually, the argument that such laws are now part of international law and agreements may be strongest argument to compel Muslims to live by such a platform, if they choose to sign said agreements.


However, a number of points need to be made here:
(1)    Although the status of international law itself is questionable, some, such as Mayer and others, argue that what has been generally accepted by international law becomes binding upon all, even if specific countries never agreed to such conventions.

(2)    Those who signed the earliest human rights accords in the 194os certainly did not expect, for example, that sexual freedom would be part of the agenda. Hence, how can they be held accountable for it?

(3)    If the agreements are binding, then the reservations put forward by Muslim countries should be accepted as binding. In other words, if they never truly agreed to the accords, how can they be held accountable for them?

(4)    There may be a great difference from the Islamic perspective and what secular Muslim states may agree to. This has been a cause of friction in Muslim lands and has led to the rise of “fundamentalism.” The paradox between what governmental leaders and lawyers agree to and what the masses may desire in their lives should be a fundamental point of issue for any human rights movement. However, by taking this view—that simply because it is law it must be abided by—the rights and wants of individuals are simply overruled.

(5)    Finally, it should be noted that it seems that even “international law” can be trumped by human rights claims.


Note the following critique by Bricmont of other “left-leaning liberals”:
The ideas criticized in this book are often implicit, but have recently been more explicitly expressed by groups defining themselves as liberals, democrats, and progressives. A perfect illustration of these ideas is to be found in a 2005 book, entitled A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq, a collective work by a number of writers who argue in favor of the war in Iraq on the basis of human rights.

The authors consider that the United States had not only the right but the duty to use its superior military force to intervene and liberate the Iraqi people from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Neither the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq nor the fact that such an intervention flouts international law troubles them in the least, convinced as they are that human rights are a value far more fundamental than respect for international law.